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Tribute to Carol Rose
Vicki Been*
INTRODUCTION
It is a great honor to be asked to pay tribute to Carol Rose, whose work
has been critically important to my own scholarship and to that of so many
of my peers. Carol has been an inspiration to several generations of
scholars, not only because of the many keen insights she has contributed
to several different fields of law, but also, perhaps especially, because of
her style of thinking, writing, and working with other scholars. Carol's
modesty, her incredible ability to cut right to the heart of the matter in the
most down-to-earth, but always amazingly well-turned phrase, and her
generosity to other scholars are models of what a more engaged, more
honest, and more gracious scholarly community could be.
Carol likes to organize things in lists-her articles include a dozen
propositions on property and takings, seven arguments on property, and so
on.' I am going to offer, then, a list of the top three reasons that Carol's
contributions to the "vastly overwritten" takings literature, to use her
phrase,2 are genuine advances of a very special sort. In the hope of
spurring Carol to develop her contributions into a more comprehensive
theory about how to ensure that government acts efficiently and fairly
when regulating property, I am then going to propose the outline for what
I hope will be her book on takings.
* Elihu Root Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. The author would like to
thank Solomon Greene, Richard Revesz, Christopher Serkin, and Katrina Wyman for insightful
comments, and Amie Broder for both expert research assistance and thoughtful comments. The
financial assistance of the Filomen D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund is gratefully
acknowledged.
1. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 329
(1996) [hereinafter Rose, Keystone Right]; Carol M. Rose, A Dozen Propositions on Private Property,
Public Rights, and the New Takings Legislation, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 265 (1996) [hereinafter
Rose, A Dozen Propositions].
2. Rose, A Dozen Propositions, supra note 1, at 265.
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I. EVER-EVOLVING BOUNDARIES BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC RIGHTS
The first major contribution that Carol has made to our understanding of
the Takings Clause is a deep and nuanced appreciation for the relationship
between the ever-evolving nature of property rights and the appropriate
reach of a compensation requirement. As Michael Heller and the others on
the panel on property theory have shown, Carol has long recognized that
property rights are fluid-they generally are mud, not crystals, to use one
of her most influential metaphors.' Although property rights must be
reasonably secure in order to promote productivity and trade, property
rights cannot be too fixed.4 Indeed, Carol would have us confront the
fluidity of property head on, by changing our rhetoric about property from
a focus on land to a focus on water:
If water were our chief symbol for property, we might think of
property rights-and perhaps other rights-in a quite different way.
We might think of rights literally and figuratively as more fluid and
less fenced-in; we might think of property as entailing less of the
awesome Blackstonian power of exclusion and more of the qualities
of flexibility, reasonableness and moderation, attentiveness to others,
and cooperative solutions to common problems.
The fluidity of property rights has several causes, and Carol's insights
about those causes have significant implications for our thinking about
takings. The most important reason property rights are, and must be, fluid,
is that property regimes-property rights and limits on those rights--"are
a means of managing conflicts over scarce resources.",6 As Demsetz and
others have demonstrated, we define property rights only when a resource
becomes sufficiently scarce that the benefits of defining individual rights
to the resource are less than the costs of doing so.' Carol pointed out that
the same logic governs the way in which we limit private property rights
by defining public rights. She explained that when we denominate
something as private property, one of the determinants of the value of that
property is its owner's ability to draw upon public resources to put the
private property to more intensive use. Private property owners often use
their land to "access . . . adjacent common resources, effectively
'piggybacking' the use of a common resource like air or water onto their
3. Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 578 (1988)
[hereinafter Rose, Crystals and Mud].
4. Rose, A Dozen Propositions, supra note 1, at 267-68, 270.
5. Rose, Keystone Right, supra note 1, at 351; see also Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of
the Public Trust, 25 ECOL. L.Q. 351, 361 (1998) [hereinafter Rose, Idea of the Public Trust].
6. Carol M. Rose, Property Rights, Regulatory Regimes and the New Takings Jurisprudence-An
Evolutionary Approach, 57 TENN. L. REV. 577, 585 (1990) [hereinafter Rose, An Evolutionary
Approach]; see also Rose, Crystals and Mud, supra note 3, at 578.
7. Rose, Crystals and Mud, supra note 3, at 578.
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individual land ownership." 8 Carol uses the example of a landowner
polluting the air or water, but it could be instead the rancher using adjacent
public lands to graze his cattle, or the owner of an urban apartment
building using the nearby public playground to provide the building's
occupants necessary recreational opportunities.
Just as in the Demsetzian story, if those public resources-clean air and
water, public lands, or public parks, become sufficiently scarce or
congested, competition for the resource will generate increasing conflicts.
As those conflict costs rise, the benefits of defining the public's right to
resources held in common, by specifying limits upon private property
owners' rights to draw upon common resources, begin to outweigh the
costs of defining and enforcing the public's rights.9 The resource held in
common can become scarce for a variety of reasons: the resource may be
an exhaustible resource; changes in the demographics of the population or
in technology may be placing increasing demands on the resource;
changes in technologies may have increased our ability to understand the
value of the resource (as when we learn the consequences of not
preserving wetlands that serve as buffers and drains in hurricanes, for
example); or the use of the resource may involve increasing marginal
costs-the ninth seawall may impose different costs on a common
resource than the first, for example.' 0
Carol points out that the relationship between scarcity and the evolving
definition of property rights is not just a function of the need to manage
the use of resources held in common. The development of nuisance law,
regulating the relationships between neighbors, also is driven by scarcity.
Behaviors such as keeping pigs in one's yard that are not a problem when
an area is sparsely settled become so when more people compete for clean
air and water, and nuisance law responds to that competition. Carol
explained:
But as more people move in, nuisance law emerges to hold these
owners to account to their neighbors and to the public-at least on an
ex post, case-by-case basis. And, finally, legislatures take over and
regulate ex ante, and in much greater detail, the areas where
landowners can and cannot locate . . . such problematic uses. The
legislatures do this in order to systematize public rights ex ante,
making their enforcement more uniform and predictable for private
landowners."
Scarcity and congestion therefore require that the boundaries between
8. Rose, A Dozen Propositions, supra note 1, at 272.
9. Id. at 282-84.
10. Carol M. Rose, The Story of Lucas, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 237, 275 (Richard J.
Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck eds., 2005) [hereinafter Rose, The Story of Lucas).
11. Rose, A Dozen Propositions, supra note 1, at 274.
Been
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private property rights and the limits on those rights necessary to protect
the public's interest in resources held in common, as well as the
boundaries between the rights of one private property owner and those of
his or her neighbors, be in a relative constant state of transition.
Although the transitions often are relatively slow evolutions, even slow
changes may cause disruptions in the expectations of private property
owners. Accordingly, takings problems commonly arise during transitions,
when one's understanding of the content of his or her property rights vis-
A-vis the neighbors' rights, or vis-di-vis the public's rights, is in flux. Carol
explains, using the example of air pollution:
When these polluting activities become more intense, they may
become exponentially more disruptive and costly. But by that time,
polluters have a transitional gains trap of their own: they have
become used to polluting, they have made capital expenditures on
that basis, and they think they are entitled to continue to pollute, just
in the same way they always have. And their neighbors may well
think, "If X can pollute, then I should be able to too." They all think
that if they are required to stop, they must be compensated ....
People come to think that they have entrenched rights to continue the
Rule of Capture and that they can continue to take things "for free"
from the commons, even when those common resources have become
scarce and fragile.' 2
Carol accordingly shows us the difficult dynamics that produce hard
takings cases: increasing scarcity and congestion demand that property
rights and limits on those rights evolve, but at the same time, people
develop expectation interests in being able to act as they always have. Just
as Oliver Wendell Holmes said, in reference to the seemingly odd doctrine
of adverse possession: "A thing which you have enjoyed and used as your
own for a long time, whether property or an opinion, takes root in your
being and cannot be torn away without your resenting the act and trying to
defend yourself, however you came by it."' 3 Private property owners come
to think of the public's lack of enforcement of its rights as converting the
right into the private property owner's. 14
To address the conflicts, Carol urges closer attention to the "continuities
and the changes in assumptions about the rights and duties entailed in
property ownership.' 5 As she explained, "property on the one hand, and
the regulation of property on the other, are aligned in a set of overlapping
evolutionary relationships."' 6 By recognizing that what at first blush may
12. Rose, Keystone Right, supra note 1, at 344-45.
13. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,476-77 (1897).
14. See Rose, An Evolutionary Approach, supra note 6, at 587.
15. Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L.
REV. 561, 598 (1984).
16. Rose, An Evolutionary Approach, supra note 6, at 577.
[Supp.: 141
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look like a private property right may instead be just a temporary gap in
the definition of public rights resulting from the lack of demand for the
specification, Carol helps us understand better why there often will be no
need for compensation in what she calls "transition management." 17
Indeed, she points out that compensating landowners for closing the gap in
the definition of public rights risks "inviting a wasteful free-for-all in
common resources-the very opposite of the aim of a property regime." 18
Carol helps us to see the importance of not requiring compensation in
such transitions in part by an insightful comparison to what she calls
"housekeeping" transitions. She notes that courts and legislators often
must adopt "background housekeeping rules" to keep the property regime
"simple, manageable and legible to outsiders and newcomers."19 Those
background rules sometimes result in an individual losing what had
previously been defined as her property rights. The original owner of land
may lose it because of rules of adverse possession, for example.2" The
holder of a covenant may lose the right to enforce it through a legislature's
imposition of recording acts or statutes of limitation, or through the courts'
imposition of a doctrine of changed circumstances.2  The holder of
property rights may find herself with only liability rule, rather than
property rule, protection of those rights.22
Carol notes that these "'housekeeping' divestments" suggest that
property rights are not absolute, but rather may be limited by rules
designed to ensure that the property regime works efficiently, even though
those rules may result in the forfeiture of individual rights. So, too, then a
property regime may require, for efficiency's sake, that the boundaries
between public and private rights constantly evolve in response to
scarcities, rather than being fixed in time.
Carol's first major contribution to our understanding of how to define
takings, then, is her very significant insights into why the boundary
between public rights and private rights is, and should be fluid, and cannot
be dammed up, so to speak, by a compensation requirement that uses a
fixed date as the baseline from which to measure private property rights.
II. LOCAL MAJORITIES VERSUS STATE AND FEDERAL MINORITIES
Carol's second most significant contribution to takings theory stems
from her early work about what she first called "a troublesome suspicion
17. Rose, The Story of Lucas, supra note 10, at 275.
18. Rose, A Dozen Propositions, supra note 1, at 294.
19. Carol M. Rose, Property and Expropriation: Themes and Variations in American Law, 2000
UTAH L. REV. 1, 12 [hereinafter Rose, Property and Expropriation].
20. Id. at 8-9.
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of local legislative bodies."23 In an article about judicial review of
piecemeal zoning changes, not about takings claims, she noted James
Madison's fear of faction, and his belief that the "antidote" to faction is a
constituency of sufficient size and variety to guarantee that every dog will
have its day.24 With a sufficiently large and diverse constituency, all
legislative action will require compromise and coalitions, and the pattern
of shifting alliances and log-rolling that ensue will ensure that all interests
will obtain some benefit through the legislative process.
Carol acknowledged that local governments lack that particular
protection. They typically have a small number of items on their agenda
and a limited diversity of interests, so log-rolling is constrained, as is the
deliberation and reflection thought to occur when the "clash of multiple
interests" slows down the legislative process.25 Thus, local legislative
bodies "cannot (or cannot always) be trusted to act with the 'legislative
due process' envisioned by The Federalist No. 10 in a larger legislature."26
But, Carol argued, the fact that local governments do not have the
features Madison identified as a check on factions does not mean that we
should treat them like second class legislatures, or as no different from
administrative agencies, as some courts and many commentators were
urging (and have continued to urge).2 7 Instead, she noted, we should
recognize that local governments have other checks on unfair domination
by one faction-checks that she calls "alternative bases of legitimacy."28
She identified two, drawing upon Albert Hirschmann's Exit, Voice, and
Loyalty: first, the ability of dissatisfied minorities within a local
government to voice their displeasure loudly; and second, their ability to
exit, or move to a friendlier jurisdiction if their complaints are not taken
seriously. Drawing upon the arguments of the Anti-Federalists, as well as
history and tradition, Carol showed that those two features of local
government have long been considered potent disciplines. She argued:
The legitimacy of local decisionmaking . . . may derive from
interested parties' opportunities for a combination of Hirschman's
elements: voice in the ability to participate in decisions, and in having
decisionmakers who know the issues directly and who try to secure
the parties' acceptance of a final decision and their continued
23. Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local
Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REv. 837, 853 (1983) [hereinafter Rose, Planning and Dealing]; see also Carol
M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. the Federalist Empire: Anti-Federalism from the Attack on
"Monarchism " to Modern Localism, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 74 (1989) [hereinafter Rose, The Ancient
Constitution].
24. Rose, Planning and Dealing, supra note 23, at 854.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 856.
27. See, e.g., Snyder v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 595 So. 2d 65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991),
quashed by 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993).
28. Rose, Planning and Dealing, supra note 23, at 882.
[Supp.: 141
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integration in the community; and exit in the parties' ultimate
opportunity to withdraw and go elsewhere. 9
Carol was addressing the problem of piecemeal changes, not the broader
problems of takings.3" Her solution to the problem of piecemeal changes
was to suggest that courts should examine whether local governments
were acting like good mediators-providing due consideration of the
interests of all affected by the change and ensuring fairness by preventing
surprise.31 That solution has not been reflected in subsequent work on
takings, although I will argue in a moment that Carol might think it
should. But Carol's insights into the different bases for legitimacy
between state and federal governments, on the one hand, and local
governments, on the other, has had a significant impact on the scholarship
about takings.
I drew heavily on Carol's work, for example, in arguing that the
possibility of exit often was a significant constraint upon local
governments' ability to drive unduly hard bargains in negotiating with
developers over exactions or impact fees as a condition to approval of
development proposals.32 Where competition among municipalities was
sufficient to give developers credible threats of exit, I argued, courts
should defer to the disciplinary force of competition rather than impose
rules like those the Supreme Court adopted in Nollan and Dolan.3 3
Others drew the opposite conclusion from Carol's insights about the
differences between local and state and federal governments, arguing that
the fact that land cannot be moved out of a local government's jurisdiction
counsels for greater judicial protection of landowners' Fifth Amendment
rights against local governments than against state and federal
governments.34 Indeed, Bill Fischel built his theory of takings, in
29. Id. at 887.
30. Indeed, Carol specifically "[left] to one side" the takings clauses of federal and state
constitutions in her discussions of the role of exit and voice in disciplining local governments. Rose,
The Ancient Constitution, supra note 23, at 96.
31. Rose, Planning and Dealing, supra note 23, at 893-910.
32. Vicki Been, Exit as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473 (1991).
33. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374
(1994).
34. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS
(1995) (arguing that courts should scrutinize local governments more closely under the Takings Clause
because property owners have greater voice in state and federal governments and because local
governments are most able to externalize the costs of their decisions onto people living outside the
jurisdiction); NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF
RIGHTS 116 (2001) (arguing that more active judicial review of local governments is required to
control majoritarian bias); see also William A. Fischel, Exploring the Kozinski Paradox: Why Is More
Efficient Regulation a Taking of Property?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 865 (1991); Vicki Been, The Perils
of Paradoxes-Comment on William A. Fischel, "Exploring the Kozinksi Paradox: Why Is More
Efficient Regulation a Taking of Property?,'" 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 913, 920 (1991) (debating the
point); cf Stewart E. Sterk, Competition Among Municipalities as a Constraint on Land Use
Exactions, 45 VAND. L. REV. 831 (1992) (arguing that exit alone will not be sufficient to constrain
Been
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substantial part, upon the notion that state and federal governments offer
landowners more viable options of exit and voice than local governments,
and therefore require less judicial scrutiny in takings cases than local
governments do.35
Fischel's arguments led Carol to revisit the work she started in Planning
and Dealing and to specifically address the importance of that work for
takings jurisprudence. Carol noted: "Some distinction among levels of
government is a much-needed corrective in the discussion of takings
jurisprudence; indeed, it is quite amazing that takings cases have so
blithely disregarded differences among levels of government and types of
governmental agencies."36 She disagreed, however, with Fischel's
assessment of the advantages and dangers of local governments. With her
characteristic carefulness and generosity, she acknowledged the validity of
Fischel's concern for situations in which local majorities disregard the
interests of the owners of undeveloped land that cannot be moved from the
jurisdiction, and noted that at such points, "takings jurisprudence might
most appropriately intervene.,, 37 But she persuasively critiqued his
argument that state and federal legislatures are more "amenable to the
exit/voice modes of civic influence than are local governments."38 First,
she showed that land is just as hard to move out of the reach of a state or
federal government as out of the local government, and that the national
government (and to a lesser extent, the state government), unlike a local
government, prevents exit not just of land, but also of other assets that
might give one influence over the government.39 As to voice, she
contested Fischel's assumption that the ability to form coalitions and
engage in log-rolling--opportunities more often available at the state or
federal level than at the local level-is equivalent to the opportunity for
speaking on one's own behalf, as one has more opportunities to do at a
local level.4"
Carol went on to suggest, in general terms, how differences between
local and state or federal governments should play out in takings
jurisprudence. She emphasized that scholars confronting takings cases
should be attuned to the different kinds of failures that would plague local
versus state and federal governments.4 ' The constraints of exit and voice,
local government exactions policies, but not taking a position on the level of judicial protection
required).
35. FISCHEL, supra note 34, at 131-35.
36. Carol M. Rose, Takings, Federalism, Norms, 105 YALE L.J. 1121 (1998) (reviewing FISCHEL,
supra note 34) [hereinafter Rose, Takings, Federalism, Norms].
37. Id. at 1133.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1134.
40. Id. at 1135-36.
41. 1 assume that she also intends for judges to pay attention to the differences between local and
other governments, as discussed infra notes 48-50 & 66-67 and accompanying text.
[Supp.: 141
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while usually a more powerful check on local governments than state or
federal governments, will sometimes fail at the local level, "with the result
that at the local level, stable minority interests may be treated unfairly. 42
Takings cases involving local governments therefore will (or should)
"especially engage the instances in which certain owners are 'singled out'
for undue burdens."43 The need for coalition politics generally will
constrain state and federal governments, but also may fail, with the result
of both "minoritarian" rent seeking, and the disadvantages of higher levels
of government ("the distance of representatives from ordinary constituents
and their problems, the corresponding influence of wealth and
organization on elections and legislation, the overly confident belief in
uniform national solutions, [and] the bureaucratic rigidity and resistance to
local circumstances that so irk citizens about their federal government"44).
She suggests that takings cases involving those governments therefore
should focus on "state and federal legislation 'as applied'-the instances
where general legislation or regulations are patently inappropriate for
special circumstances" and on "the owners whose special plights are
ignored in the breezy generality of national legislation., 45
Although it was not very expansive about her own views (as befits a
gracious review of another's work), Carol's review of Fischel's book was
an important advance in our thinking about takings. Most obviously, it
influenced Fischel, who later wrote The Homevoter Hypothesis, in part to
respond to Carol's description of Regulatory Takings as within the
tradition of "localism bashing." '46 While the "tough love" approach to local
governments that he outlines in The Homevoter Hypothesis includes a
compensation requirement, the role of that requirement is more nuanced
and more realistic about the costs and benefits of judicial review than
advocated in his earlier work.47
Others have drawn upon Carol's understanding that exit and voice may
serve to constrain a local government's decision-making in ways that are
important to takings jurisprudence as well.48 Indeed, Mark Rosen recently
offered an extensive argument in support of "tailoring" constitutional
42. Rose, Takings, Federalism, Norms, supra note 36, at 1138.
43. Id. at 1151.
44. Id. at 1138-39.
45. Id. at 1150-51.
46. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 288 (2001).
47. Id.; see also id. at 272-75, 283-85.
48. For other discussions that have relied upon Carol's insights, see, for example, Melvyn R.
Durchslag, Forgotten Federalism: The Takings Clause and Local Land Use Decisions, 59 MD. L.
REV. 464, 486-89 (2000); Inna Reznik, Note, The Distinction Between Legislative and Adjudicative
Decisions in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 242, 276 (2000). Carol's insights also have
informed scholarship outside the takings context. See, e.g., Richard C. Schragger, Reclaiming the
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protections according to the level of government at issue. His arguments,
in part, draw upon the bases for the legitimacy of local governments that
Carol emphasized: "[T]he systemic differences in exit costs across
different levels of government are a prima facie basis for tailoring
constitutional principles to different levels of government. Generally
speaking, there is less need for judicially enforced constitutional
protections at lower levels of government, where exit costs are lower."
'4 9
Again, Rosen did not work out the details of how the different bases for
legitimacy of local governments should shape takings jurisprudence.5
Much work remains to be done on that issue, but Carol has made a very
significant contribution to takings theory by focusing our attention on the
differences, and the potential for a takings jurisprudence that is correctly
attuned to those differences.
III. CRYSTALLINE RULES AND MUDDY STANDARDS
Carol has given us, then, both an admonition to consider the different
strengths and weaknesses of local, state and federal governments when we
consider whether a regulation effects a taking, and the understanding that
both private property rights and the limits on those rights necessary to
protect property held in common by the public are constantly evolving not
(or not just) for troublesome reasons, but because of quite legitimate
cost/benefit calculations of the value of finer-grained definitions of the
respective rights. Those insights led to the third major contribution Carol
has made to takings jurisprudence: the explication of when and why
takings doctrine may be abstract and hard-edged, when it must instead be
contextual and flexible, and why we should expect oscillation between
crystals and mud. Many takings mavens have debated whether takings
doctrine should be composed of flexible standards or rigid rules over the
years,51 but we owe a special debt for Carol's early, clear, thorough, and
49. Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional Principles, 153 U.
PA. L. REV. 1513, 1610-11 (2005).
50. Stewart Sterk has suggested that federal courts in fact reach different results when both the
property taken and the offending regulation are the product of state, rather than federal, law. But his
claim is that the courts are driven by federalist concerns, rather than by the level of government that
made the challenged decision, and the different bases for legitimacy of the various levels of
government. Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114
YALE L.J. 203 (2004).
51. See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1629 (1988)
("balancing-or better, the judicial practice of situated judgment or practical reason" is necessary in
takings jurisprudence because of the inherent difficulty of reconciling private property and
democracy); see also Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and the
Consequences of Clarity, 92 CAL. L. REV. 609, 617 (2004); Marc Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in
Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 93 (2002); Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of
Property: Crosscurrents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, in REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 120, 133-35
(1993); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Allure of Consequential Fit, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1261, 1270
(2000). But see, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1697 (1988).
[Supp.: 141
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sophisticated examination of the issues.
In her 1988 article, Crystals and Mud, she explained that on the one
hand, what she calls crystalline doctrines-the "per se" rules of Loretto5 2
or Lucas53 -are desirable to help people shape their behavior and invest
with confidence. They help promote trade, by making clear who owns
what rights, and therefore who one has to negotiate with to acquire those
rights. They also constrain the discretion of government regulators and by
so doing, reduce the opportunity for rent-seeking from interest groups
anxious to secure advantage from the regulators' exercise of discretion.54
On the other hand, crystalline takings rules will sometimes produce gross
injustices-subjecting property owners to majoritarian oppression or one-
size-fits-all generalities, or allowing huge "land grabs" of the resources
held in common by the public-because the imagination of those
specifying ex ante rules will simply fail to anticipate the almost unlimited
variety of conflicts that will arise, and the context-specific differences that
might require variations in the rules.
One approach, then, would be to try to specify when crystalline rules are
least likely to produce unanticipated injustices. That, of course, is what
Justice Scalia tried to do in inventing a per se rule for total diminutions in
value in Lucas. He argued that the category of 100% wipeouts would be
small, and that the scope of justifications that might excuse a 100%
wipeout would be extremely narrow and knowable ex ante.55 But, of
course, buried in qualifications and the footnotes were all the reasons that
a crystalline rule might work grave injustices. The scope of the rule
depended upon (among other things) the baseline against which
"limitations inherent in title" are to be measured, as well as upon the
definition of the boundaries of the property.56
Justice Scalia's attempt to tidy things up has not fared well in the
ensuing decade. First Palazzolo,57 then Tahoe,5 8 reasserted the role of ad
hoc balancing tests and other muddy standards in takings jurisprudence.
But Carol advised that see-sawing between "per se" rules and "ad hoc"
standards in takings doctrine should be expected: "the history of property
law tells us that we seem to be stuck with both."59 She explained that the
very fact that crystalline rules are attractive because they "yield fixed
52. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
53. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
54. "[T]he muddier the rules, the greater the likelihood that interest groups will bid for whatever
asset' is the object of the decision-maker's discretionary choice, frittering away resources in the
bidding process." Rose, Crystals and Mud, supra note 3, at 591.
55. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018.
56. Id.atO16n.7.
57. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); see also id. at 636 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
58. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
59. Rose, Crystals and Mud, supra note 3, at 593.
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consequences" makes them prone to "overuse[] ... in contexts that make
them unpredictable and counterproductive."6 Carol argued that it is the
"booby trap aspect of what seems to be clear, simple rules-that scenario
of disproportionate loss by some party-that seems to drive us to muddy
up crystal rules with the exceptions and the post hoc discretionary
judgments. 61
Her examples of forfeitures in contract law drive home the point that the
law abhors dramatic and disproportionate loss, 62 and that hard-edged rules
that appear to sanction such losses may undermine rather than foster the
certainty, facilitation of trade, and avoidance of the "frittering away" of
resources in rent-seeking that hard-edged rules are designed to promote.
63
Similarly, hard and fast takings rules, if they result in disproportionate
losses for private property owners, will make owners too timid about
investing in and using property. Hard and fast takings rules that result in
disproportionate losses to common resources, on the other hand, will make
the public too timid about allowing the commons to be used.' Carol's
warning about forfeitures, thus, is directly applicable to takings as well:
Simple boundaries and simple remedies, it turns out, may yield
radically unexpected results, and may destroy the confidence we need
for trade, rather than fostering it. It is forfeiture, the prospect of
dramatic or disproportionate loss, that brings that home; and
forfeiture-and the detailed ways in which it might have been
avoided--can only be known to us ex post.
65
But Carol's insights about the crystal to mud and back again cycle also
tell us more about when we might profitably use crystalline rules: she
notes that rules seem to be most helpful and most needed when the parties
are in one-time relationships, with no repeat play or ongoing relationship,
because it is then that "temptations to dupe each other, or simply to play
commercial hardball, might be strongest., 66 Muddy standards, on the other
hand, seem to "mimic a pattern of post hoc readjustments that people
would make if they were in an ongoing relationship with each other."
67
Interestingly, that understanding of when rules are most needed tracks
Carol's insights about the different bases for legitimacy that apply to local
60. Id. at 599.
61. Id. at 597.
62. Id. at 598.
63. Id. at 591.
64. Id. at 600; see also Rose, Keystone Right, supra note 1, at 365 ("[T]he in-your-face rhetoric of
property rights can undermine actual institutions of property, suggesting that anything goes, and that
the property owner need not care in the least for his fellows. That is not what makes property work to
make a society richer. And it is not what makes democracy work to make a society freer.").
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and state and federal governments: where interest groups need each other
for coalition politics, they are unlikely to play hardball, except in
situations in which they can identify a "discrete and insular minority" they
will never again need at the bargaining table. Similarly, when members of
a community can use voice, and the threat of exit, to constrain over-
reaching by a local government and the members of the community to
which the government most responds, they take advantage of the
protections of an ongoing relationship.
Rather than simple rules for a complex world, as takings scholars such
as Richard Epstein have advocated,68 Carol teaches us that simple rules
will often produce unexpected results that are so harsh that they will lead
to inefficiencies in the property regime. The complexities of the world
demand fluid standards. Carol's insights reveal that those standards can
and should seek to mimic and reflect the ways in which ongoing
relationships moderate the complexities of evolving situations.
IV. COMMON SENSE TAKINGS: MAKING BETTER USE OF CAROL'S
INSIGHTS
These three very significant contributions Carol has made to the field of
takings law unfortunately have not always received as much attention as
they deserve. The courts, for example, have failed to use many of Carol's
insights. To be sure, Carol's writings have made some inroads in the
courts. Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Lucas, for example, recognizes
that the common law of nuisance has not or does not evolve quickly
enough to justify the faith Justice Scalia puts in it to limit private property
rights.69 That concurrence surely owes a debt to Carol's work. Similarly,
Justice O'Connor's affection for rules rather than standards, expressed in
her concurrence in Palazzolo7" and trumpeted by the majority in Tahoe,7
owes much to Crystals and Mud and to Carol's Dozen Propositions.
Nevertheless, I would have hoped to see more evidence that judges were
reading, and heeding, Carol's lessons. One can imagine any number of
reasons that the evidence of Carol's influence on the courts falls short of
what we academics would want. For my purposes, though, the most
useful, even if perhaps not the most accurate, theory is that Carol has not
yet pulled her takings work together in a counterpart to Richard Epstein's
Takings,72 or Bill Fischel's Regulatory Takings.73 I believe Carol's book
68. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995).
69. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1035 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
70. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 632 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
71. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
326-27 (2002).
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on the subject, which obviously would need to have a three-word title,
might appropriately be called Carol Rose's Common Sense Takings.
To generate further discussion about Carol's contributions to the theory
and doctrine of takings, I have sketched an outline of the central themes I
believe Carol's book would adopt. I am not trying to write her book, of
course-I could not come close to Carol's incredible way with words, for
starters. But I am hoping to prod her to draw out the implications of her
insights for the takings debates that undoubtedly will continue to swirl
around the Supreme Court in the years to come. So, with apologies to
Carol for what undoubtedly are many errors, I suggest here how the three
major contributions Carol has made to the literature on takings might be
pulled together into a more comprehensive theory of takings.
A. Takings doctrine should primarily be composed of muddy ex-post
standards rather than ex-ante crystalline rules.
The many variables necessary to identify when compensation should be
paid-the scope of private property rights, the boundary between those
rights and the public's rights, the stage of the overlapping evolution of
those sets of rights, and the level of government imposing the limit, to
name a few-are too complex and contextual to make hard-edged rules
workable in all but the exceptional circumstance such as physical
appropriations through eminent domain. Thus Carol has argued: "As with
nuisance, takings cases are ex post and case-by-case-messy though this
approach sometimes seems-because the circumstances of individual
owners and their properties vary enormously, as do the conditions giving
rise to regulation."74 Indeed, nuisance law serves as a useful guide to how
courts should address takings problems, because "takings" doctrine is a
"meta-version" of nineteenth-century courts' nuisance jurisprudence:
"Like nuisance adjudications, takings adjudications are post hoc judicial
determinations and are based generally on ordinary practice and
reasonable expectations about which regulatory efforts are fair and normal
and which are not.",75
B. Takings doctrine should be concerned about fostering a better
regulatory scheme.
Carol views takings law as "regulating the regulators., 76 Because land
resources are increasingly scarce, she argues that
we do not need just any regulatory regime, we need a good one. We
73. FISCHEL, supra note 34.
74. Rose, A Dozen Propositions, supra note 1, at 287.
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need a regulatory regime that helps us to internalize externalities-a
regulatory regime that induces us to think carefully about the way we
use land without distorting our decision-making process or diverting
us from activities that are worthwhile and valuable.77
Carol's concern about regulating the regulators comes, in part, from her
insights about the reasons a democratic society protects property. In
several works, she evaluates the arguments typically given about the
political importance of property. While she finds difficulties with each of
the arguments, she nevertheless notes that "[e]ven free speech might be
hard put to rival the sheer number and persistence of property's claims for
political pre-eminence in democratic governments. 78 Property plays an
important role in society, Carol believes, and resources are simply too
precious to have an "anything goes" approach to the regulation of
property.7 9
C. Takings doctrine therefore would start with an inquiry about the nature
of the regulators at issue, the different dangers posed by federal, state,
and local governments, and the efficacy of existing constraints upon those
regulators.
As illustrated by her review of Fischel's work, Carol is wary of
supplanting, or even supplementing, the mechanisms that now constrain
local, state and federal governments with more intensive judicial review of
legislation or regulation.8" She has far less faith in judges to get it right
than Fischel expressed in Regulatory Takings (and than others have
advocated).8 ' Carol instead would first ask whether judicial scrutiny,
beyond rational basis review, was necessary at all, given inherent
constraints. By focusing on the dangers that various levels of government
pose, she would narrow the class of cases that might require
compensation, and direct the courts' attention to those.
D. At the state and federal level, attention to the dangers of over-
regulation would lead to a focus on whether the regulator is sufficiently
attuned to the need for local exceptions.
In her discussions of the dangers of regulation by state and federal
governments, Carol worries about decision-making that is overly
abstracted from the actual patterns of land use. She cautions against
planners that try to think too far out in the future and imagine potential
externalities, with the effect that regulations control, at considerable cost,
77. Id. at 589.
78. Rose, Property and Expropriation, supra note 19, at 4.
79. Rose, An Evolutionary Approach, supra note 6, at 594.
80. Rose, Takings, Federalism, Norms, supra note 36.
81. See FISCHEL, supra note 34.
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problems that are not really problems.82 That concern motivates her
suggestion that courts have a role to play in preventing state and federal
governments from imposing one-size-fits-all solutions on problems that
have local peculiarities. Some might argue that her concern is best
addressed by a somewhat more intensive scrutiny of the fit between the
means and the ends of the regulation, through a due process analysis.
Others might suggest that her concern calls for a least restrictive means
test, again (after Lingle83), through a due process challenge. But Carol
seems to envision that the concern would be addressed through as-applied
takings claims-claims that although the government's interest is a
legitimate one, it is not necessary (or at least something more than
rational) to achieve that interest at the extraordinary cost the regulation
imposes because of the peculiar circumstances of this landowner.
Perhaps given her appreciation for local mediative processes like
variance procedures, Carol has in mind something like the standard for
variances-that the regulation as applied leaves the landowner unable to
earn a reasonable return on the land because of the unique circumstances
of the land, the local ecosystem, or other local variations in the general
problem that motivated the statute.84 Where the landowner could not show
some unusual feature of her situation that made the general legislation
unfair to apply, but was complaining instead about new limits on the value
of her private property arising from a generally applicable adjustment of
rights necessary to accommodate increasing scarcity or congestion of a
public resource such as wetlands, Carol would not require compensation,
as explained below. Where the landowner could not show exceptional
circumstances, but nor could the government justify the general change as
an evolutionary development of the boundaries between private property
and public rights, Carol would trust the coalition politics that serve to
legitimate state and federal governments to ensure that the landowner will,
over time, gain some benefit to offset her loss.
E. At the local level, the danger of majoritarian oppression would require
a focus on whether the private property owner had an opportunity to be
heard, received due consideration of his or her interests, and was
protected from surprise.
The court would focus its scrutiny, in those cases involving local
government, on the process that marked the government's decision-
82. Rose, An Evolutionary Approach, supra note 6, at 588.
83. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074 (2005).
84. Variances were intended, of course, to allow local governments the discretion necessary to
avoid takings claims. But perhaps because of the suspicion of such processes that Carol takes on in
Planning and Dealing, supra note 23, little attention has been paid to incorporating into takings
jurisprudence the standards that have been developed to govern the discretion local governments
exercise in reviewing variance applications.
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making, rather than solely on the substance of the regulation. In Planning
and Dealing, Carol urged that courts reviewing piecemeal changes focus
on a mediation model, which would examine whether the changes were
"ill-considered or unfair."85 Evaluating whether the change was duly
considered requires attention to whether "interested parties had enough
opportunity to participate."8 6 Adapting her analysis to the takings context,
she would have the court examine first whether the decision-maker gave
the party claiming unfairness an opportunity to be heard, or considered the
potential for unfairness through devices like a takings impact review or
cost-benefit analysis.87 Then, she would consider whether the procedures
used were sufficient to foster mediation of the various interests-were
hearings, impact reviews, and other processes and procedures used "to
publicize issues, to draw in interested parties, to examine alternative
solutions, and to satisfy the public that the issues have been fully
explored?"88
Such an approach "would require that norms and tradeoffs be disclosed
and explained case-by-case." 89 That could be demonstrated through
thoughtful (not boilerplate) findings, but Carol was especially keen on the
use of impact analysis as "an ultimate explanation of norms and tradeoffs
in an impact statement."9 Carol was writing about environmental impact
statements, not takings impact statements (indeed she is skeptical about
state statutes requiring takings impact analyses).9' But her arguments have
considerable force in suggesting that a court should be wary about finding
a taking where the local government has explained the costs that it is
imposing upon property owners, and explained why it has chosen to
impose those costs. Explanation, Carol wrote, "reinforces and encourages
an exploration of issues and potential accommodations; the very fact that
decisionmakers have to explain outcomes may encourage them to think of
alternatives and mitigations. '" 92
Finally, the mediative approach would look for evidence that the
affected parties were treated fairly. The touchstone of fairness that is most
appropriate, in Carol's view, is "predictability, or protection from
surprise. ' 93 That protection comes in part from good planning-
"continuous and careful reevaluation of resources and goals" which
''encourages communities to think ahead and to publicize their intentions,
85. Rose, Planning and Dealing, supra note 23, at 893.
86. Id. at 894.
87. Id. at 895-96.
88. Id. at 897.
89. Id. at 899.
90. Id.
91. See Rose, A Dozen Propositions, supra note 1, at 288.
92. Rose, Planning and Dealing, supra note 23, at 899-900.
93. Id. at 903-04.
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and in fact to weigh how they expect to develop.,9 4 But it also depends
upon the property owner's ability to avoid the regulatory scheme through
exit.95 In short, courts would look to whether property owners had "an
opportunity to get out of harm's way if they did not wish to bear the
risks. 96
Carol illustrates her points by noting the propensity of the political
process, and regulatory regimes, to favor "'insiders' at the expense of
'outsiders,"' with the ugly result of exclusionary zoning or NIMBYism. 97
She would accordingly have judges pay particular attention to, for
example, instances of individual down-zonings that appeared on the heels
of majority opposition to a proposed disfavored use. In those situations
especially, neither voice nor exit may be sufficiently robust to ensure due
consideration or fairness.
F. Takings doctrine would be attentive to the nature of the resource at
issue, the content of the specific rights alleged to accrue to the holder of
the resource, and the reason for the transition in the definition of the
boundary between those private rights and the public rights that generated
the conflict.
Carol would hold that "compensation [is] not due when regulation
effectively prevent[s] private owners from doing something to which they
were not entitled., 98 The fact that the property owner has been allowed to
put her property to some use in the past does not mean that she is entitled
to continue.99 Nor is a property owner necessarily entitled to a use just
because others, seemingly similarly situated, have been allowed to put
their property to that particular use.' Instead, Carol would determine
whether the regulation that seemingly changes the boundaries between
private property and public rights was in fact a natural evolution brought
about by increasing scarcity and congestion. Generally, the Fifth
Amendment would not require compensation for regulations that seek to
protect public or "diffuse" resources because increasing scarcity demands
that property rights be defined to avoid conflicts. Carol points out that
there might be good reasons for the legislature to award compensation for
such transitions in certain circumstances, but she generally would not
allow judges to require the legislature do so.' 0 '
The question Carol poses will not be an easy one to answer, of course.
94. Id. at 907-08.
95. Id. at 903.
96. Id. at 910.
97. Rose, An Evolutionary Approach, supra note 6, at 588.
98. Rose, A Dozen Propositions, supra note 1, at 275.
99. Id. at 282-84.
100. Rose, The Story of Lucas, supra note 10, at 275.
101. Rose, A Dozen Propositions, supra note 1, at 284-87.
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Carol has acknowledged: "The difficulty lies in the old question of
definition: just what properties count as 'impressed with a public trust' for
purposes of takings defenses and why?"'' 0 2 Further, Carol recognizes that
"fairness considerations comparable to estoppel may sometimes weigh in
favor of compensating owners who are required to cease their intrusions
onto public resources."'
0 3
G. Private nuisance law cannot serve as the only baseline from which
limitations on private property rights are measured.
Nuisance law is a useful starting point for the analysis of whether the
evolution of property law and the regulatory regime now justifies the
regulation of the externality. But the notion advanced in Lucas that the
common law of nuisance is the primary limitation on a property owner's
expectations is clearly wrong, under Carol's account. First, as noted
above, nuisance law will only develop to regulate a conflict when the
benefits of promulgating and enforcing the law outweigh the costs of
doing so. Thus it is folly for the Court to freeze the applicable law of
nuisance at any particular time, such as the date on which the property
owner acquired the property. Nuisance law is by its very nature
dynamic.10 4 Second, looking only to the common law of nuisance and
ignoring legislative definitions of nuisance ignores the fact that
legislatures step in to codify and fill gaps in nuisance law when the
benefits of notice and certainty are sufficient to justify the costs of
legislative attention to the definition of nuisance. It also ignores the
traditional role legislatures have paid in protecting against "common" or
"public" nuisance. 1°5 Third, the common law of nuisance essentially
atrophied for many conflicts, because the courts found the issues too
daunting and insoluble through litigation. As Carol notes, "[C]ourts ceded
to legislatures-especially local legislatures, through zoning-the
increasingly complex task of defining the ways that land uses might be
restricted as being unusually burdensome to the neighbors or to the public
at large."'0 6
H. Average reciprocity of advantage and other "rough substitutes" for
compensation would be a defense to takings claims.
Carol's work on takings evidences considerable concern about the ways
in which regulation of property sometimes imposes costs on individuals
that are well justified, without compensation, because those costs are
102. Rose, Idea of the Public Trust, supra note 5, at 357.
103. Rose, A Dozen Propositions, supra note 1, at 285.
104. Rose, The Story of Lucas, supra note 10, at 276.
105. Rose, A Dozen Propositions, supra note 1, at 275.
106. Id. at 277-78; see also Rose, Property Rights, supra note 6, at 588.
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"offset by some reciprocal benefits."' 7 Similarly, she has argued that
schemes that grandfather pre-existing uses for limited times provide the
kind of rough substitute for compensation that should answer calls for
compensation under the takings clause."0 8 Carol's willingness to count
those adjustments as compensation stems in part from her recognition that
in their mediative roles, local governments often find that "an appropriate
solution is not always a single answer complying with fixed standards, but
rather a mix of accommodations."' 0 9
CONCLUSION
I am sure I have made many errors in trying to articulate the
comprehensive theory that flows from Carol's insights about takings. But I
hope to have suggested enough of an outline to provoke Carol to
undertake a book on takings that will correct all my mistakes, fill in the
gaps, and provide guiding principles for all those earnestly seeking to
make sense of the Fifth Amendment's compensation requirement. Carol's
contributions to our thinking about when compensation should be paid to
owners whose property values are affected by regulatory changes are
already enormous, so it may not be fair to ask for more. But given the
scarcity of real advances in the field, perhaps Carol will forgive us for
calling for a readjustment of the boundaries between her right to put her
time and talents to other uses and our thirst for her always extraordinarily
cogent analysis.
107. Rose, Planning and Dealing, supra note 23, at 902.
108. Rose, The Story of Lucas, supra note 10, at 276-77.
109. Rose, Planning and Dealing, supra note 23, at 891.
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